Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
Economic Research Institute Study Papers

Economics and Finance

5-1-1979

Should Dairymen Be Paid for Milk on The Basis of Protein
Content?
Rondo A. Christensen
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri

Recommended Citation
Christensen, Rondo A., "Should Dairymen Be Paid for Milk on The Basis of Protein Content?" (1979).
Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 377.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/377

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Economics and Finance at DigitalCommons@USU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Economic Research
Institute Study Papers by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu.

May 1979

Study Paper #79-1

SHOULD DAIRYMEN BE PAID FOR MILK
ON THE BASIS OF PROTEIN CONTENT?
by

Rondo A. Christensen

ECONOMICS RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Utah State University
Logan, Utah 84322

SHOULD DAIRYMEN BE PAID FOR MILK
ON THE BASIS OF PROTEIN CONTENT?
Rondo A. Christensen
In 1961, Professor George W. Trimberger, of Cornell University, pOinted
out the trend toward consumption of lowfat fluid milk and manufactured dairy
products, the nutritional appeal of protein in milk, and the fact that protein in milk varies from herd to herd, and raised the question, IIWhen will
U. S. dairymen sell milk on the basis of protein content?1I
In the meantime others have jumped on the IIband wagon

ll

for what is

commonly called component pricing - pricing milk on the basis of fat and
protein or nonfat solids.

Component pricing has been recommended by various

individuals as a more equitable way of paying producers, a way to reduce
"watering" of milk, increase protein in producer milk, increase protein in
fluid milk products, increase yields of manufactured dairy products, increase
consumer nutrition, and equalize ingredient costs to fluid milk processors.
Claims by some nutritionists, dairy scientists and economists as to the
advantage of component pricing have been so far reaching as to prompt the
question from the floor at the last annual convention of the National Milk
Producers Federation, "Will component pricing solve all of the problems of
the dairy industry?"

None of us expect that it will.

More important, how-

ever, what problems will it solve, and what problems will it create?
Rondo A. Christensen is Professor of Agricultural Economics at Utah State
University, Logan, Utah.
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During the two decades which have followed since it became practical
to test and pay for milk on the basis of protein or solids notfat, a few
market milk cooperative associations, some manufacturing plants and the State
of California have adopted some form of component pricing.

Most of the

dairy industry however, expecially the market milk sector, continues to
use the hundredweight-butterfat differential price plan developed in the
1940s.

This article deals mainly with whether use of component pricing would
increase or decrease equity in paying market milk producers.
Manufacturing Grade Milk
Components in milk ought to be used in pricing only if they have extra
value - that is, if the market pays or logically ought to pay extra for
additional amounts, and if the extra value exceeds the extra cost of identifying, pricing, and marketing additional quantities of the component.
Most of the rationale for using component pricing has come from or has
been based on applications appropriate to the pricing and marketing of manufacturing grade milk.

The main ingredients in milk that have value in

manufacturing are the solids - the fluid carrier is basically in the way
and only adds to transportation and processing costs.

The more fat, protein

and other nonfat solids in milk, the more butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk,
cottage cheese, and ice cream that can be made.
There would be some extra cost to pricing manufacturing milk according
to its protein or nonfat solids content, but the cost would be minimal and
would relate mainly to testing and pricing operations.

No additional haul-

ing or handling costs would be required since manufacturing milk would already be going direct from farms to local manufacturing plants on a regular
basis.
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Indeed, it would appear that component pricing would be an equitable,
efficient way to price manufacturing grade milk, and that its effect on
the industry would be positive and beneficial.
Market Milk
After concluding that additional fat, protein and other nonfat solids
in manufacturing milk have value, and that component pricing would be appropriate for manufacturing grade milk, some proponents have then assumed that
what is good for the goose must also be good for the gander, and that component pricing would be appropriate for market milk - milk produced for
fluid consumption.

In doing so, there has been a failure to properly take

into account the nature of demand for fluid milk products and the unique
characteristics and methods of operation in the market milk industry.
Demand for fluid milk
The primary mission and success of the market milk industry lies in
satisfying consumer demand for fluid milk beverages that are fresh, natural,
palatable and nutritious, and that fit their life style.

It does not spring

from offering consumers units of fat and protein or nonfat solids.

Consumers

have for years largely thumbed their noses at the opportunity to buy milk
nutrients and enjoy a lowfat, high protein, less expensive fluid milk product by mixing nonfat powdered milk with water in their homes.

While we

need standards to guarantee consumers minimal nutritional components in
fluid milk products, we also need to remember that with fluid milk products
we are selling beverages, not units of fat and nonfat solids.
Some interpret the trend in consumption away from high fat fluid milk
products as a trend toward products high in protein.
The trend is toward low fat-low protein milk.

Such is not the case.

Sales of high fat milk (whole
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milk) by regulated handlers in Federal order marketing areas decreased from
78.4 percent of total fluid milk sales in 1970 to 63.4 percent in 1977 (Table 1).
Even though sales of whole milk have decreased, they still account for a majority of sales.

Sales of high protein milk (fortified lowfat and skim milk)

after increasing from 13.5 percent of sales in 1970 to 15.4 percent in 1972,
decreased to 11.6 percent in 1977.

On the other hand, sales of low fat-low

protein milk (plain lowfat and skim milk) more than

trebled~

increasing from

8.1 percent of sales in 1970 to 25.0 percent in 1977.
Nonfat solids used by Federal order handlers to fortify Class I products
decreased from 46.8 million pounds in 1972 to 28.2 million pounds in 1977.
These data indicate that even though most consumers have the opportunity
to buy fortified products, the trend is toward less fortification and lower
rates of fortification.

While there are studies that indicate consumers

prefer a higher solids milk product, the track record in the market place
indicates that consumers are not willing to pay a higher price for a higher
solids product when the option of a lower price and a lower solids product
is available to them (Townsend, 1978).
Value of milk components
It can be appreciated that additional solids in manufacturing milk have
extra value.

But what about components of market milk?

Do they have extra

value?
Consumers prefer fresh fluid milk products to reconstituted milk products.

It costs considerably more to produce a local supply of fresh milk,

transport it to consuming centers, make it available to processors on demand, and carry the operating and seasonal reserves that are necessary because of variations in supply and demand, than to reconstitute butter and
powder, and consumers have demonstrated that they are willing to pay for it.
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Table 1.

Sales of packaged whole milk, lowfat milk and skim milk in
Federal milk order marketing areas by regulated handlers,
United States, 1970-1977*

Percent of total
Low fat, skim milk

Sales billions of ~ounds
Low fat, skim mil k
Year

Whole
Mi1k#

Plain+

Solids
Added¢

Total

Whole
Mi 1k

Plain

Solids
Added

Total

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

25.2
24.9
24.6
23.7
22.4
22.3
22.9
22.1

2.6
3.0
3.4
4.1
5.2
6.4
8.0
8.7

4.4
4.7
5. 1
5.0
4.6
4.5
4.0
4.0

32.2
32.6
33.0
32.8
32.2
33.1
34.9
34.8

78.4
76.3
74.4
72.2
69.6
67.3
65.5
63.4

8.1
9.2
10.2
12.6
16.2
19.2
22.9
25.0

13.5
14.5
15.4
15.2
14.2
13.5
11 .6
11 .6

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

*For markets where comparable data were available.
in-area sales.

Includes only

#Inc1udes whole milk and flavored whole milk.
+Includes plain lowfat and skim milk, buttermilk and flavored milk drinks.
¢Includes lowfat and skim milk with nonfat solids added.
Source:

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Marketing Service.
Federal Milk Order Market Statistics. Annual Summaries.
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The extra utility consumers associate with fresh fluid milk products
gives the fluid carrier in market mil k us'ed in fluid mflk products· extra
value.

The more hundredweights of milk produced and delivered to the market,

the more fluid milk products that can be processed and packaged.

The extra

value of additional hundredweights of fluid carrier used in fluid milk products is essentially the Class I price differential.

In Federal orders this

varies from a low of $1.12 in the Upper Midwest market to a high of $3.15
in the Southeastern Florida area, and averages about $2.00 (USDA, Summary
of Major Provisions In Federal Milk Marketing Orders, 1978).
Fat can be removed from or added to market milk, and milk can be standardized to any des i red level of fat.

Some of the fat removed from milk

used in processing fluid milk products can be used in ice cream, creamed
cheese and cottage cheese.

Most of it, however, ;s used in making butter.

Since residual amounts of fat in market milk left over after processing fluid
milk and cream products are used in making butter, the value of extra fat
in market milk is the value it has in making butter.

This essentially is

the butterfat di fferential, since the latter is based on the value of fat
in butter.
Nonfat solids, unlike fat, cannot be removed from milk used in fluid
milk products.

They can be added to standardize milk at higher levels of

nonfat solids, but they cannot be removed to standardize downward.
From a practical point of view this means that additional nonfat solids
in market milk used for fluid products have extra value only if they replace
nonfat solids which otherwise would have to be added to meet minimum Federal,
state or label standards.

The value of additional nonfat solids in milk

which substitute for nonfat solids whi.ch otherwise would have to be added,
is the cost of adding extra nonfat solids to milk.
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If market milk already contains sufficient quantities of protein or
nonfat solids, and fluid milk products made from it do not require fortification, then additional nonfat solids in milk would have no value because
it would not be economical to charge handlers for them (Zurborg, 1978).
Most nonfat solids in market milk would have extra value if minimum
solids notfat requirements were as high as they are in California where whole
milk must contain at least 8.6 to 8.8 percent depending on the butterfat
test, lowfat milk must have a minimum of 10 percent, and skim milk must contain a minimum of 8.25 percent.

Most states, however, follow the Federal

Food and Drug Administration standards which require a minimum of 8.25 percent solids notfat in all fluid milk products (USDA, Agriculture Handbook
No. 51).

This is considerably below the average solids notfat content of

market milk, which is around 8.6 to 8.7 percent.

It was 8.67 percent in

California in 1978 (California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, 1979).
In practice, how much market milk is used in fluid milk products which
are fortified with extra solids notfat? Of the 77.9 billion pounds of market
milk received from producers by handlers regulated under Federal orders in
1977, only 4.7 billion pounds, or 6.0 percent was used in fortified lowfat
and skim milk products sold in and out of Federal order marketing areas (USDA,
Statistical Bulletin No. 611).
These data indicate that for Federal order milk handlers, who handle 80
percent of all market milk produced in the U.S., additional nonfat solids
in milk have little extra value in fluid milk products.

Extra solids in

whole milk and unfortified lowfat and skim milk would have little if any
value, and they make up about 90 percent of total fluid milk sales.
Component pricing of market milk a gimmick
Some proponents of component pricing contend that even though additional
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amounts of protein (or solids notfat) in mi.1k _may not have extra value in
fluid milk products, market

~ilk

ential or premium for them.

producers still ought to be paid a differ-

The logic given i.s that protein has: extra ya1ue

when used in manufacturing, and that producers

~hou1d

wflether their mil k i's used for f1 uid or manufacturing.

be paid for this value
It is as.serted that

if efficiency is to prevail in the market, fluid milk. handlers should at
least pay for the protein fn the milk they use what it i.s. worth in alternative non-fluid uses.
To rlemonstrate that this

i~

not being done and that the present hundred-

weight-butterfat differential pri.ce plan i.s. "faultyll in that tt does not
provide for paying extra for high prote.in test JDi 1k, proponents have made
analyses to show how blend prices would be redtstrtbuted among producers
if both butterfat and protein

differentia1~

were llsed (Luedtke and Steely,

1975, Snyder and Smi.th, 1978, and Whitaker, 19.78),

Under the procedures used

th.e same amo.unt Of funds would 5e paid out, but th.e blend price would be adjusted so as to permit paying a differential for both butterfat and protein.
It was assumed that no additional funds would be available from the market
to pay producers.
Th.e results predictably s.how that in comparis.on to what they would receive under component pricing, producers of low protein test milk relative
to fat are overpaid and producers of high protein test .mi1k relative to fat
are :underpaid under the prevailing hundredweight-butterfat differential price
plan . (compare columns 4 and 5 in Table 2 which. show prices 20. producers
having varytn,g protein and fat tests would have received under the pricing
proYis50ns of the Great Basin Federal order during February 19]7, compared
with what they would .have re.cei:ved under a hypothetical component price).
Th.ese results not only lead proponents to conclude that component
priCing of market milk would be

~ore

equitable to producers, but that if
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Table 2.

Hypothetical component prices based on market milk blend values
of milk for manufacturing, Great Basin Federal Order Marketing
area. February 1977.
Great Basin Blend

Protein
Producer test

1
17
33
49
65
81
97
113
129
143
145
161
177
193
209
225
241
257
273
274

ButterButterfat fat
test
price

Percent

Percent

2.94
3.14
3. 18
3.23
3.27
3.29
3.33
3.36
3.39
3.41
3.41
3.46
3.49
3.54
3.62
3.71
3.81
3.93
4.26
4.47

3.80
3.59
3.78
3.51
3.88
4.05
3.66
3.65
3.91
4.37
3.68
3.75
4.20
3.83
4. 15
4.23
5.10
4.75
3.95
6.00

Hypothetical
component
price

Value for
manufacturing
based on fat
and protei n *

Do 11 ars eer hundredweight of mi1k at test
9.61
9.38
9.58
9.30
9.69
9.87
9.46
9.44
9.72
10.21
9.47
9.56
10.03
9.64
9.98
10.06
10.99
10.62
9.77
11 .94

9.31
9.21
9.44
9.19
9.60
9.80
9.41
9.41
9.71
10.21
9.48
9.59
10.08
9.72
10. 11
10.25
11 .24
10.94
10.30
12.61

7.86
7.91
8. 16
7.95
8.38
8.59
8.24
8.26
8.58
9.08
8.36
8.50
9.01
8.69
9. 13
9.33
10.37
10. 17
9.77
12. 19

*Based on the Great Basin Class III price of $8.16 and BF differential of
$1.04 per pound of fat and on assumed pool protein test of 3.41, (which was
the average for the 20 producers included in the table). Class III price
allocated to butterfat was 3.5 lbs of fat times $1.04 = $3.64. The remaining
portion of the Class III price, $4.52, was allocated to protein as a proxy
for all nonfat solids and equaled $1.33 per pound of protein.
Source:

The first five columns of the table are based on "Component Pricing
of Milk - A More Equitable Way," Utah Science, Vol. 39, No.4.,
December, 1978, Utah Agriculture Experiment Station, by Morris D. Whitaker.
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each unit of protein and butterfat had a value as they would if component
pricing were used in selling milk to fluid milk processors, handlers would
be motivated to utilize milk's nonfat components more efficiently by satisfying the demand for fluid milk products with lower protein test milk, and
diverting high protein test milk to manufacturing (Whitaker, 1978).
Such analyses and conclusions rather than demonstrating that the
hundredweight-butterfat pricing system ;s inappropriate for market milk,
vividly illustrate how component pricing of market milk without higher
minimum standards for fluid milk products than now exist in most parts of
the country could create false incentives that could damage the fluid milk
market, which is the basis of the market milk industry.

Market milk pro-

ducers, fluid milk processors and consumers all ought to be apprehensive
about a pricing system that would result in paying more for market milk used
in manufacturing than for fluid, and which would drive high quality milk
away from the fluid market, especially with proceeds partially derived from
fluid milk sales.
The fallacy of such a pricing system can be seen by comparing the hundredweight-butterfat differential and hypothetical component prices in
Table 2 with the value of fat and protein in milk for manufacturing.

In all

cases, except for one producer whose milk tested abnormally high in both
fat and protein, prices paid producers under the hundredweight-butterfat
differential price plan equaled or exceeded the component values of fat and
protein for manufacturing.

Use of component pricing and paying a premium

for high protein milk would have only increased the amount by which producers
of high protein milk would have been overpaid for their milk in relation to
its value for manufacturing.

11
There is no need nor justification for component pricing where
high protein milk has little or no extra value in fluid milk products,
and the market milk blend price already exceeds the value of the fat
and nonfat solids in milk for manufacturing.

Component pricing of market

milk and the payment of premiums for extra protein at first appears
logical, fair, equitable and in keeping with modern nutritional trends,
but upon closer examination, turns out to be only a pricing gimmick which
transfers income from one group of producers to another, for no logical
reason.
What is the gimmick or pricing quirk in proposed component pricing
plans that makes what at first appears to be logical, lead to such illogical
conclusions and results?

It is the payment of a premium for high protein

milk because of the extra value of the additional protein when used in
manufacturing, plus the market milk blend price which includes a pro-rata
share of the extra value of the fluid carrier when used in fluid milk
products.

The latter amounted to $1.11 per hundredweight of producer milk

in the Great Basin Federal order area in February, 1977, the month of
the price comparisons in Table 2.
Adding a protein premium to the blend price results in a price for
high protein milk which is greater than its value for either manufacturing
or fluid use.

It would seem logical for producers to be paid the extra

value their milk has for manufacturing or for fluid use, but not for both.
Producers who insist on receiving a premium for the value extra protein
in their milk has for manufacturing should be prepared to lose or forfeit the
value the fluid carrier in their milk has in the fluid market, since by
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committing their milk to manufacturing, it no longer is available
for use in the fluid market.
Component pricing of market milk under these circumstances where
premiums or differentials are added to blend prices and where extra
protein or solids notfat have value only in manufacturing, does not
increase equity in paying producers, but results in just the opposite.
Without additional funds coming from the market, the only way more can
be paid to one group of producers, ;s to withhold it from another group.
Analyses and conclusions that lead to component pricing of market
milk place more importance on what premium is paid than on fluid milk
sales and the resultant blend price that can be paid.

Nothing would be

gained by producers from a 10 cent per hundredweight premium for extra
protein if it resulted in high protein milk being driven to the manufacturing
market, a lowering in quality and sales of fluid milk products, and a
drop in the blend price of 10 cents or more.

Analyses that lead to the

conclusion that component pricing of market milk is more equitable to
producers than the prevailing hundredweight-butterfat differential price
plan result from looking at the extra value additional protein has by
itself rather than together with the fluid carrier as is necessary in
the fluid milk market.

It demonstrates what can happen when we equate

the market for market milk to fat, protein and other nonfat solids,
rather than beverages with minimum protein or solids notfat content.
When producers affiliate with the market milk rather than the manufacturing milk industry, they in effect commit their milk to meeting the
needs of handlers for milk for fluid use.

In return for this committment,

they share in the Class I differential paid by handlers for the fluid

...
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carrier in milk used for fluid milk products as they participate in
receiving the market blend price.

In 1977, the average blend price in

Federal order markets exceeded the Minnesota-Wisconsin price for
manufacturing milk by $1.28 per hundredweight (USDA Statistical Bulletin

No. 611).
Milk must always be available for fluid use for producers to logically
claim the blend price.

Whether their milk is actually used for fluid or

diverted to manufacturing is an administrative decision made by the
handler or producer association that markets the milk.

That decision

depends mainly on the location of the milk, the make up of bulk tank assembly
routes, the location of fluid milk and manufacturing plants, the daily
and seasonal variations in supply of milk from producers and demand for
milk by fluid milk handlers.
If market milk producers are to be paid a premium or differential
for the extra value additional protein in their milk has when used in
manufacturing, and there is little or no extra value for fluid use, the
premium should be added to the manufacturing price at standard test, not
to the market milk blend price.

It would also seem logical to deduct

any extra marketing costs associated with handling high test protein
milk separate from other market milk.
It is obvious from Table 2, that if most high protein milk producers
were offered a choice of the value of their milk for fluid or for
manufacturing, they would choose the market milk blend price, because in
most instances, the extra value of the fluid carrier in fluid milk
products exceeds the extra value of additional protein and other nonfat
solids in manufacturing.
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Other Considerations
Rejecting component pricing as a means of paying premiums for high
protein milk does not solve the problem of low protein milk which
contains less protein or solids notfat than minimum Federal, state or
label requirements.

This milk not only yields poorly if manufactured,

but also must be fortified if used in fluid milk products.

It obviously

is overpriced under the hundredweight-butterfat differential price plan.
Rather than paying a premium for extra nonfat solids in high test
milk that have no extra value in the fluid market and are already adequately
compensated if used in manufacturing, a discount or penalty should be
deducted to compensate for the fact that the milk would have to be fortified
to bring it up to standard for use in fluid milk products, and that it
has reduced value if used in manufacturing .

Without higher minimum

standards than now exist in most parts of the nation, this form of component
pricing would be more efficient and equitable, and would put the price
incentive to upgrade the quality of producer milk more squarely where it
belongs.
Component pricing would be a rather indirect, ineffective way to
eliminate the adding of water to milk, to the extent that it exists.
Perhaps a better solu tio n would be to assess a stiffer penalty if any water
at any time were detected, such as being degraded for a year, or permanent
loss of membership if a member of a marketing cooperative.

Farmers adding

water to their milk do not deserve to be a part of the fluid milk market
nor receive the blend price paid for market milk.

Component pricing is

not the answer to this problem, however, because even with component pricing
of market milk, one of the components must be the fluid carrier, as it is
in California.

To not include the fluid carrier as one of the components

...
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in pricing market milk, would on the one hand place a greater value on
fat and nonfat solids than their alternative value in manufacturing if
the value of the fluid carrier were added to them, or reduce the value of
market milk to the value of manufacturing milk if the value of the fluid
carrier were eliminated.

If the latter were done, fluid milk processors

undoubtedly would not be able to obtain sufficient supplies of milk to
supply the market.
Producers of high protein test milk look to component pricing as a
way to get more for their milk.

The simple facts of the ma tter are,

however, that unless fluid milk handlers are charged more f or the extra
protein there is no extra money to logically pay a premium to producers,
and if handlers are charged for the extra protein, they won ' t want the
milk if it is above the minimum standard.

Even in California where

component pricing is used and where minimum standards are high, handlers
are careful not to buy more protein in milk than they need in order to
meet minimum standards if they can avoid it.

For this and other reasons,

all colored herds such as Jersey, Guernsey, and Ayrshire have virtually
disappeared from the Class I market.

Those that remain in production

generally sell to cheese plants (Maes, 1978).
Some look to component pricing as a way to increase protein content
in producer milk.

Even though in the long run it may be physically

possible through feeding and breeding to increase protein levels in milk,
studies are beginning to show that the most economical way to increase
production of protein and solids notfat is still to feed and breed for more
total milk production, not for higher levels of notfat solids (Townsend, 1978,
and Wankier, 1978).

The component characteristics of fluid milk produced in

California where component pricing has been used for al mos t 20 years do
not appear to have been notably changed by component pricing (Maes, 1978).

Selling milk to fluid milk handlers on a component basis would
equalize the cost of components to them, but it would create unequal costs
per unit of product, such as a half gallon of milk, if the amount of nonfat
solids varied, especially if they exceeded the minimum standard.

One

reason Federal milk orders were implemented was to help stabilize the market
.,

by equalizing the ingredient cost of milk per unit of product among
competing handlers.

Selling milk to handlers on a component basis could

reintroduce an element of instability into the market, unless nonfat
components in producer milk are standardized.
To avoid buying extra nonfat solids above minimum standards which
have no value to them in fluid milk products, handlers in California who
buy on a component basis, attempt to manage incoming raw product to
achieve relatively uniform outgoing solids notfat near the prescribed
minimum standard.

Larger plants divert high solids milk to nonfluid

operations; plants purchasing from cooperatives request incoming milk at
desired levels of nonfat solids.

Small plants may lack the capability to

achieve uniform solids notfat in finished products and thereby experience
adverse economic effects if incoming milk tests too high or too low.

If

it is too high, they pay for extra solids that are not needed and for which
they cannot recover the cost from the market; if it is too low, they must
fortify it with additional nonfat dry solids (Maes, 1978).
There has been some confusion between the roles of component pricing
and minimum standards for nonfat solids in fluid milk products.

Some

favor the use of component pricing to increase protein in fluid milk
products, when in fact without higher standards, as has been previously

.
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indicated, it might drive some high protein milk now being used in fluid
products to the manufacturing market, if it is not needed to meet
minimum standards.
If more protein or nonfat solids in fluid milk than now exist in most
parts of the nation are socially desirable, then a more direct and
effective way to get them would be to set and enforce higher standards
I

1

on a state or Federal level.

With minimum standards as high or above the

average natural content of prote in and nonfat solids in milk, most nonfat
solids in market milk would have extra value in the fulid market.

Once

this were the case, then component pricing would be an equitable way of
paying market milk producers for nonfat solids in their milk, up to the
minimum standard in fluid milk.

In terms of a logical order or sequence

of events, first should come higher minimum standards to give extra nonfat
solids in producer milk value in fl uid milk products, then component
pricing to pay producers for the extra nonfat solids in high test milk.
Use of a protein or nonfat solids differential from a standard test, would
also deduct value from producers whose milk is low in nonfat solids.
Before minimum standards are increased throughout the nation to levels
comparable to or above those in California, careful consideration should
be given to the effect this would have on costs, prices and fluid milk
consumption.

Any additional costs of fortification can be expected to

be passed on to consumers, and they are currently choosing in the market
place lower solids milk at lower prices over higher solids milk at higher
prices.
Some look to California as evidence that component pricing, if not
higher minimum standards for nonfat solids and component pricing, increases
sales and per capita consumption of fluid milk products .

Often overlooked,

however, when rationalizing the higher levels of milk consumption is that

18
the retail price of milk in California is about 20 percent lower than in
the nation as a whole, per capita income is about 11 percent higher, .and
the California dairy industry spends about 50 cents per capita annually
on dairy advertising.

In actuality, these latter factors probably have

more of an effect on consumption of milk in California than do minimum
standards and component pricing (Christensen, 1979).

..
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